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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 971746-CA 
v. : 
MINH NGOC HA, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of aggravated assault, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(A) (Supp. 1998); and 
assault, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 1998) 
(copies attached in Add. A). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court commit plain error when it accepted defendant's proffer of a 
non-certified interpreter when, without any warning, defendant announced that an 
interpreter would be necessary for his next and final witness in a two-day trial? 
Because defense counsel below registered no objection to the court's use of his 
proffered interpreter, defendant must establish plain error on appeal. To do so, defendant 
must show that an error occurred, that it should have been obvious to the trial court, and 
that it was harmful. State v. Marvin. 964 P.2d 313, 318 (Utah 1998); State v. Finlavson. 
956 P.2d 283, 292 (Utah App. 1998), cert, granted (Oct. 10, 1998). 
2. Did the trial court commit plain error in failing to sua sponte object to the 
prosecutor's initial and rebuttal closing arguments? 
Because this issue was not preserved below, the same standard of review noted for 
issue 1, supra, applies here. 
3. Did defendant's trial counsel provide ineffective assistance when he failed to 
object to remarks made in the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument? 
When a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is raised for the first time on 
appeal, this Court reviews it as a matter of law. State v. Bryant. 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah 
App. 1998); State v. Snvder. 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993). Review is highly 
deferential to avoid second-guessing counsel's actions with the benefit of hindsight. 
Bryant. 965 P.2d at 542; Snvder. 860 P.2d at 354. 
4. Does the cumulative effect of the alleged errors warrant reversal of defendant's 
convictions? 
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When presented with a claim under the cumulative error doctrine, an appellate 
court reviews all identified errors and then determines if their cumulative effect 
undermines confidence in the verdict. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to the 
resolution of the issues presented on appeal is contained in or appended to this brief, 
including: 
Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 3-306 (in Add. C). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with aggravated assault, a second degree felony, and 
assault, a class B misdemeanor, stemming from a stabbing which occurred in Salt Lake 
County on May 19, 1996 (R. 1-2, 34-36). He was apprehended in Seattle, Washington 
nearly twelve months later (R. 1-2; 193:129-31).1 Following a two-day trial, a jury 
convicted defendant as charged, and the trial judge sentenced him to concurrent sentences 
of one-to-fifteen years in prison for the aggravated assault and six months in the county 
jail for the assault, plus restitution and costs (R. 131-32). The court also strongly 
recommended mental and emotional health counseling at the prison (R. 131, 194:16). 
Defendant timely filed an appeal (R. 138). 
1
 Citation herein to transcripts is to the volume number on the cover of each 
transcript volume, followed by a colon and the internal page number, i.e., R. 193:7. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 19, 1996, eighteen-year-old Tai Luu and his friend Vu Tran picked up Jon 
Ha, seventeen-year-old Hanna Kim, and Hanna's friends Diane and Lisa, and went out to 
eat (R. 193:44-45, 85-87, 94, 114). Over dinner, they decided to go to Cafe Ha Vi, a 
karaoke club in West Valley City frequented that night mostly by Vietnamese (R. 193:42-
44, 86-87, 114, 124). Tai had never been there before, but Hanna had been there a couple 
of times (R. 193:44, 69, 88). Tai drove them to the club, where they danced and 
socialized (R. 193:48, 70, 114). Hanna was sure she did not drink any beer that night, but 
Tai could not remember whether or not he had (R. 193:48, 70, 95-96). 
Eventually, Tai told the group he was ready to go home and left the club with Vu 
Tran behind him (R. 193:71, 74). Vu wanted to drive, so Tai headed toward the passenger 
side of his car (R. 193:46, 75-76). As they walked to the car, Vu noticed defendant walk 
by and heard him say, "What's up?" (R. 193:115-16, 120). Vu parroted the words in 
response (R. 193:115, 120). Tai didn't pay much attention and continued to the car (R. 
193:46-47, 71, 73-74). When Vu approached the driver's side of Tai's car, he noticed 
defendant walk up behind Tai (R. 193:115-16). 
As Tai opened the passenger door, he felt a sudden blow to the right side of his 
back (R. 193:45, 58, 75, 76, 84, 116). Looking over his shoulder, he saw defendant one 
foot away and poised to strike him again (R. 193:45,48-49). Tai had not seen defendant 
in the club that night or at any time before that moment and had no idea why he would hit 
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him (R. 193:47). Tai turned and ran through the cars in the parking lot to a chain link 
fence twelve to fifteen feet away (R. 193:45, 49, 50, 58, 76-77, 83, 116). As he ran, he 
kept his body slightly turned so that he could keep track of defendant's progress (R. 
193:101-02). However, as he neared the fence, he became weak and dizzy (R. 193:49, 
77-78). When defendant caught up to him, Tai noticed a knife in defendant's right hand 
(R. 193:45, 48, 79). Tai grabbed the knife with both hands, trying to keep defendant from 
stabbing him, and held it several seconds until he got dizzy (R. 193:45, 49-51, JL. 79-80). 
He described the knife as being ten or eleven inches long, seven inches of which was a 
three-inch-wide blade (R. 193:45-46). 
Meanwhile, Hanna and her friends left the club. Hanna was talking to another 
friend in the parking lot when she heard people yelling and screaming in various 
languages and someone saying "fight" in English (R. 193:89-90, 98). Turning to look 
around the parking lot, Hanna saw defendant chasing Tai and swinging his arm at him (R. 
193:90-91, 100). Hanna raced to the pair, reaching Tai as he got to the fence and standing 
immediately in front of him facing defendant (R. 193:50, 91, 102-03). She and defendant 
yelled at each other while other people tried to hold onto defendant (R. 193:91, 103, 105, 
117). 
With Hanna between him and defendant, Tai rested against the fence and reached 
behind him to where he had been hit (R. 193:50, 80). Suddenly, the weakness, the 
dizziness, and the knife made sense to him, and he realized that he had not been hit, but 
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stabbed (R. 193:52). The inside of the jacket he was wearing was soaked with blood and 
there was blood on Tai's hand when he drew it away from his back (R. 193:52, 65-67). 
Hanna looked back to see how Tai was, heard him say he had been stabbed, and 
noticed blood for the first time (R. 193:91-92, 106). She renewed her yelling at 
defendant, asking why he had done it (R. 193:52, 92, 106). She noticed the handle of a 
knife and a glint of silver in defendant's hand (R. 193:107-08, 112). Despite the arms 
holding him back, defendant managed to free the hand holding the knife and hit Hanna 
across the jaw with the handle (R. 193:48, 50, 92, 107-08). 
Tai started to make his way toward his car, yelling that he had been stabbed (R. 
193:80). Vu and Jon put him in his car and took him to the nearest hospital (R. 193:52-53, 
117-18). However, the severity of the wound required that he be transferred to the 
University of Utah Hospital where he remained for at least nine days, requiring surgery 
and numerous stitches (R. 193:53-54; 151-52, 155, 157, 176). The knife went through his 
chest cavity and a lung, then punctured his diaphragm (R. 193:155). It resulted in 
damage to Tai's lungs, prolonged trouble breathing, and a reduction in his ability to be 
physically active (R. 193:53-54).2 The medical expert opined that without medical 
treatment, Tai likely would have died (R. 193:156-57). 
2Tai was admitted to the University of Utah Hospital under an alias for his 
protection (R. 193:151-52, 158, 176). 
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Nine days later, Detective Alan Call had Hanna look at a photo array of six 
pictures (R. 193:94, 128-29). She positively identified defendant's photograph (R. 
193:94). She thereafter identified him at the preliminary hearing and at trial (R. 190:7; 
193:88). She had no doubt about her identification, not only because of the tattoo of a 
question mark defendant sported on his forehead3, but because she was familiar with 
defendant before the stabbing occurred (R. 193:88-89, 96-97). She had seen him twice at 
Ha Vi before the night of the stabbing (R. 193:88), had exchanged phone numbers with 
him (R. 193:88-89), and had seen him one or two weeks before the stabbing when both 
were at a local mall (R. 193: 89). She also noticed him earlier in Ha Vi the night of the 
stabbing (R. 193:96). 
Tai looked at the photo array while he was in the hospital and chose defendant and 
a second person as possible matches to his assailant, telling Detective Call that his 
attacker had a tattoo of a question mark on his forehead (R. 193:62-63, 127-28). Tai 
positively identified defendant at both the preliminary hearing and trial (R. 190:29; 193: 
42-43). 
Vu Tran reported that he had seen defendant near Ha Vi before the stabbing, gave 
the police a description of defendant, including his tattoo, and later identified defendant at 
trial (R. 193:116-17, 119,121). 
defendant's tattoo was visible from fifteen to eighteen feet away (R. 193:111-12). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I: This Court should not review defendant's claim of plain error in the trial 
court's concession to use defendant's non-certified interpreter for one of defendant's 
witnesses because defendant invited any error. Defendant informed the court at the time 
he called his final witness on the second day of trial about the need for an interpreter and 
simultaneously offered the interpreter of his choice-a friend of defendant's family who 
had interpreted in other unrelated official proceedings but was not officially certified. 
Defendant thereafter failed to alert the trial court to any alleged problem with the 
interpreter's performance. In any event, defendant fails to establish that the trial court's 
acceptance of the proffered interpreter amounted to plain error, especially where 
defendant establishes no harm from the interpreter's performance. 
Point II: The prosecutor's comments in his closing arguments concerning the 
tattoo of a question mark on defendant's forehead did not constitute plain error. The 
remarks made in his initial closing argument-asking the jury to consider the likelihood of 
there being someone else at the same club on the same night who matched defendant's 
physical description and had the same tattoo in the middle of his forehead-were a 
reasonable deduction from the evidence adduced at trial and the defense that someone 
besides defendant must have committed the crimes. The comment made in the 
prosecutor's rebuttal argument-that defendant is likely to be the only person "in this 
society" having a tattoo in the middle of his forehead-might technically constitute error to 
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the extent it reflected the prosecutor's opinion of a fact not in evidence, but was not plain 
when taken in the context of the parties' arguments. Further, the evidence against 
defendant in this case was very compelling, leaving no reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result absent the prosecutor's rebuttal remarks. 
Point III: Defendant fails to establish either deficient performance or prejudice to 
prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Counsel's failure to object 
to the prosecutor's rebuttal remarks in closing can be readily attributed to reasonable trial 
strategy. Moreover, had he objected and the trial court issued a curative instruction, a 
different outcome is not reasonably probable given the strength of the evidence. 
Point IV: Defendant's claims of error are unfounded as there were no errors or, 
alternatively, any error was harmless. Defendant's conviction resulted from strong 
incriminating evidence, not cumulative error. Hence, his cumulative error claim fails. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF 
PLAIN ERROR IN THE USE OF A NON-CERTIFIED INTERPRETER 
FOR ONE OF DEFENDANT'S WITNESSES BECAUSE DEFENDANT 
INVITED ANY ERROR WHICH OCCURRED; FURTHER, DEFENDANT 
ESTABLISHES NEITHER ERROR NOR HARM IN THE USE OF THE 
INTERPRETER 
Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error in permitting Tarn 
Huynh to interpret the testimony of defendant's sister, Tran Nguyen, without complying 
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with the requirements of rule 3-306, Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Br. of Aplt. at 
9-21. He contends that Huynh is a non-certified, non-qualified interpreter who may 
possibly have hindered defendant's ability to present a defense and may have impacted on 
Ms. Nguyen's credibility. Id. However, defendant's argument fails under the facts of this 
case. 
On the second day of trial, as defendant called his final witness to the stand, he 
informed the court for the first time that the witness would need an interpreter: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL] We would call Tran Nguyen [as a witness]. And, 
your Honor, she does not speak English. I do have an interpreter presents [sic] to 
translate her testimony. 
THE COURT: Very well. Let's have your interpreter come forward and 
take the oath. 
Has this person been certified? To your knowledge, [defense counsel], has 
the interpreter been certified? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL (to interpreter)] Have you been certified? 
MR. HUYNH: Actually, we don't have such vocation in Utah, but I do 
perform vocation in front of the Industrial Commission. 
THE COURT: I mean through the administrative office of the courts. But 
apparently not. 
Your name, sir? 
MR. HUYNH: Tarn, T-A-M, and the last name is spelled H-U-Y-N-H. 
THE COURT: Will you, sir, please raise your right hand and take the oath 
of interpreter? 
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(R. 162-63). Huynh took the oath, after which the prosecutor sought a bench conference. 
The record then reflects the following: 
THE COURT: Go ahead, [defense counsel], as a result of our bench 
conference, I believe you're prepared to make a statement for the jury. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL] That's correct, your Honor. 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I want to advise you in advance of 
questioning Ms. Nguyen, that Tom [sic], who's the interpreter, is a friend of Ms. 
Nguyen's family. That includes the defendant, Mr. Minh Ha. He has been present 
during the trial. He was present during the preliminary hearing that we had in this 
case and has been present throughout the various court proceedings that have 
brought us to trial today. 
(R. 163-64) (this exchange and the entirety of Ms. Nguyen's testimony is attached in 
Add. B). 
A. Because Defendant Invited The Alleged Error Below, This Court Should Not 
Review His Claim On Appeal 
Defendant argues plain error on appeal because his trial counsel did not object to 
the use of Huynh as an interpreter for Ms. Nguyen.4 However, defense counsel did more 
than simply remain silent when Huynh took the interpreter's oath: he offered Huynh to 
the court as his interpreter of choice. Moreover, the exchange suggests he did so without 
knowing whether Huynh was certified, and he showed no concern when, finding him to 
be uncertified, the court permitted Huynh to take the oath and interpret the testimony. 
4Defendant does not challenge his counsel's failure to object as ineffective 
assistance. 
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Appellate courts will "not appraise all rulings objected to for the first time on 
appeal under the plain error doctrine.... If a party through counsel has made a conscious 
decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial court into error, we will then decline 
to save that party from the error." State v. Brown. 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) 
(quoting State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1989), cert, denied. 497 U.S. 1024, 
110 S. Ct. 3270 (1990)) (additional citations omitted). This avoids any possibility of 
sanctioning a procedure that fosters invited error. Id. 
Assuming, arguendo, any error occurred in using of Huynh to interpret, defendant 
appears not only to have made a conscious decision to refrain from objecting, but also to 
have affirmatively led the court into making the error. Defendant did not ask the court to 
obtain an interpreter for defendant's sister prior to trial. Instead, he announced for the 
first time that he needed one and had brought one when Ms. Nguyen was called to the 
stand as the final defense witness on the second day of trial. Defendant's intent to use 
Huynh is clear, not only from the timing of the offer of his services, but from the 
admission that Huynh was present during trial and throughout the various court 
proceedings leading to trial. 
There are several strategic reasons defendant might want Huynh as an interpreter 
and would, therefore, refrain from objecting or raising any possible barrier to his 
acceptance by the court. Huynh was familiar with the case, had experience interpreting in 
adversarial settings, and was a friend of both defendant and his sister, giving him the 
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ability to provide a certain comfort level or trust for them. Defendant may even have felt 
that Huynh might be able to present his sister's responses in a light more favorable to the 
defense. 
Under the circumstances of this case, this Court should refuse to review 
defendant's plain error claim to avoid fostering invited error. State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 
627, 635 (Utah App. 1997) (a strategic decision not to object forecloses appellate review 
of the alleged error even under the plain error doctrine). 
B. Defendant Fails To Make The Requisite Showing Of Plain Error, Defeating 
His Claim 
In the event this Court addresses the merits of defendant's claim, it must do so 
under the plain error doctrine. Generally, the choice of an interpreter is reviewed on 
appeal under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Fung, 907 P.2d 1192, 1194 (Utah 
App. 1995). Moreover, defendant has the burden to show that he was '"somehow denied 
a fair trial by the interpreter's deficiencies.'" Fung, 907 P.2d at 1194 (quoting State v. 
Mendoza. 181 Ariz. 472, 891 P.2d 939, 942 (Az. App. 1995)). 
However, because defense counsel below registered no objection to the 
prosecutor's comments, defendant argues plain error on appeal. To establish plain error, 
defendant must show that an error occurred, that it should have been obvious to the trial 
court, and that it was harmful. State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 318 (Utah 1998); State v. 
Finlavson. 956 P.2d 283, 292 (Utah App. 1998), cert, granted (Oct. 10, 1998). Where a 
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defendant fails to establish harm, the appellate court need not reach the other elements of 
the plain error analysis. Marvin. 964 P.2d at 318; Finlavson, 956 P.2d at 292. 
1. No error occurred in the use of defendant's chosen interpreter 
Defendant argues that the trial court's failure to expressly comply on the record 
with each of the requirements of rule 3-306, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
constitutes error (a copy of the rule is attached in Add. C). Br. of Aplt. at 13-16. 
However, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court's acceptance of the 
proffered interpreter was not erroneous. 
While the trial judge did not verbally walk through the requirements of rule 3-306 
before permitting Huynh to interpret for Ms. Nguyen, he arguably met the basic -
requirements for appointing Huynh as a qualified interpreter. Under rule 3-306(6)(B), 
qualified interpreters may be used within the following guidelines: 
(B) Qualified interpreters. 
(i) Standards for appointment. A qualified interpreter may be appointed 
only under the following circumstances: 
(a) if there is no certification program established under subparagraph (4) 
for interpreters in the language for which an interpreter is needed, 
(b) if there is a certification program established under subsection (4), but 
no certified interpreter is reasonably available, or 
(c) for juvenile probation conferences, if the probation officer does not 
speak a language understood by juvenile. 
(ii) Procedure for appointment. Before appointing a qualified interpreter, 
the appointing authority or delegate shall: 
(a) evaluate the totality of the circumstances including the gravity of the 
judicial proceeding and the potential penalty or consequence to the accused person 
involved, 
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(b) qualify the prospective interpreter by asking questions as to the 
following matters in an effort to determine whether the interpreter has a minimum 
level of qualification: (1) whether the prospective interpreter appears to have 
adequate language skills, knowledge of interpreting techniques and familiarity 
with interpreting in a court or administrative hearing setting; and (2) whether the 
prospective interpreter has read, understands, and agrees to comply with the code 
of professional responsibility for court interpreters set forth in appendix H. 
Add. C. 
On this record, Huynh met the standard for appointment under subsection 
(B)(i)(b). First, the trial judge's questions to Huynh suggest that a certification program 
exists through the administrative office of the courts (R. 193:162). Second, the manner 
and timing with which defendant informed the court of the need for an interpreter for Ms. 
Nguyen foreclosed the possibility of obtaining a certified interpreter without delaying the 
proceedings. Nguyen was defendant's last witness in the second day of a two-day trial. 
The only other interpreter immediately available without causing a delay was defendant's 
own court-appointed interpreter, Tony Ngo. However, the practical difficulties in having 
the same person interpret for a testifying witness and still interpret all objections and 
other important in-court commentary for defendant in the process renders use of 
defendant's interpreter impractical.5 
5This same analysis would support the use of Huynh as a non-certified, non-
qualified interpreter under subsection (6)(C): MA non-certified, non-qualified interpreter 
may be appointed when a certified or qualified interpreter is not reasonably available . . . 
." Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 3-306. Add. C. 
Moreover, contrary to defendant's assertion (Br. of Aplt. at 12), even if Huynh was 
non-certified and non-qualified, he would still be required to comply with the Code of 
Professional Responsibility for Court Interpreters. Utah R. Evid. 604 (noting, without 
15 
The record also reflects that the trial judge sufficiently complied with subsections 
(B)(ii)(a) and (b) to permit Huynh to be used as a qualified interpreter under the rule. An 
evaluation of the totality of the circumstances of the case does not expressly appear on the 
record, but would have been readily apparent to the trial judge and could not have been 
far from his mind in dealing with an unexpected development regarding the final defense 
witness in a two-day trial dealing with felony and misdemeanor assault charges. Also 
readily apparent to the court would have been the fact that defendant himself was offering 
what defendant believed was a viable solution to the problem-a separate interpreter of his 
choice. 
While the trial court's questioning of Huynh was limited, the court was still able to 
determine whether the interpreter had a "minimum level of qualification" as is required 
for subsection (b). Huynh did not speak broken English and responded to the court's two 
questions appropriately (R. 193:162-63). Add. B. He not only was familiar with 
qualification, that interpreters are "subject to the provisions of the[] rules relating to . . . 
the administration of an oath or affirmation to make a true translation"); Utah Code Jud. 
Admin. R. 3-306(8) (after discussing appointment of certified, non-certified, qualified, 
and non-qualified interpreters and allowing for appointment of non-certified and non-
qualified interpreters, providing that "All interpreters, before commencing their duties, 
shall take an oath that they will make a true and impartial interpretation using their best 
skills and judgment in accordance with the Code of Professional Responsibility") 
(emphasis added); Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 3-306(9)(D) (permitting a trial judge to 
remove any interpreter for "failing to follow... standards prescribed by law and the Code 
of Professional Responsibility...."); Code of Professional Responsibility for Court 
Interpreters (Introduction) (noting that the Code is binding upon all persons who deliver 
interpreting services to the judiciary). 
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interpreting in an administrative hearing setting but had actually done so before the 
Industrial Commission, apparently on an on-going basis (R. 193:162). Add. B. Whether 
Huynh knew of and agreed to comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility for 
Court Interpreters was apparent not only in his taking of the oath swearing to abide by the 
code but in his active practice before the Industrial Commission where the same 
adherence to the code would be required. Huynh was not only a family friend of 
defendant, but had attended all previous court hearings in this case, making him familiar 
with the facts and the court proceedings. The trial court's acceptance of the proffered 
interpreter suggests that he was satisfied as to Huynh's minimum level of qualification, 
and that qualification was reinforced through the subsequent examination of Ms. Nguyen. 
The record reveals no hesitation or difficulties on Huynh's part in interpreting either the 
English or the Vietnamese, and no one questioned his interpretations or voiced any 
uncertainty over any part of the exchange. Add. B. 
2. Assuming error, it was not obvious to the trial court 
Even assuming the trial court erred in failing to strictly and expressly verbalize 
each of the requirements of rule 3-306, the error would not necessarily have been obvious 
to the court. Under the circumstances of this case, where many of the considerations 
behind use of an interpreter were readily apparent to the trial judge and defendant himself 
offered the interpreter ultimately used, the trial judge may reasonably have determined 
that defendant's apparent strategy was more important than the strict requirements of rule 
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3-306, so long as the proffered interpreter had some experience interpreting judicial or 
administrative actions. Moreover, there was the added safeguard in this case of having a 
certified, qualified interpreter in the courtroom throughout the witness' testimony-Tony 
Ngo. Any possible concern the court might harbor at that point was necessarily 
minimized as Ms. Nguyen gave her testimony and no one gave any indication of a 
problem or concern about the translations. Under these circumstances, any error in the 
trial court's use of defendant's chosen interpreter would not constitute plain error. 
3. No reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome exists absent the 
alleged error 
Regardless of the trial court's compliance with rule 3-306, defendant's claim of 
error fails because he does not establish that there would have been a more favorable 
outcome had the court appointed a certified interpreter. See Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 
1251, 1254-55 (Utah 1997) (when a trial court errs in failing to comply with a 
requirement under the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, reversal is warranted only 
where the error is harmful, i.e. there is a reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome 
of the case). Defendant speculates that a certified interpreter might have "accurately" 
translated Ms. Nguyen's testimony, thereby possibly persuading the jury to credit her 
testimony over the State's witnesses. Br. of Aplt. at 21. However, nothing in the record 
suggests that Ms. Nguyen's testimony was improperly interpreted in any respect by 
Huynh, highlighting the speculative nature of defendant's claim of prejudice. Moreover, 
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defendant fails to provide any example in which Ms. Nguyen did not in fact say what the 
interpreter credited to her, 
testimony was inaccurately translated r ^ However, defendant's court-appointed 
interpreter, who is fluent in English and Vietnamese, heard the entirety of Nguyen's 
testimony as stated by Ms Nguyen and as interpreted by Huynh. I le was in the best 
pc sitic i 1 to judge tt le ace . . . . ^ i 
' ~ bic interpretation or to alert defense 
counsel or the trial judge to any alleged problem. He failed io do so. At no time was 
there a concern raised b> an\ one in the courtroom about Uuynh's translations,6 and the 
record reflects no uncertain!;. ...;,:..: ...., , 
I i lu 'u i«ii ildVmlf' ] * ' — * appeal t :) identify any irregi llarity 3i* 
deficiency in the interpretation which might arguably have harmed him, but he fails to do 
''Defendant notes that during M s . 1 4"guy en's testimoi ly, the tn •: -- --. 
mentioned "language barriers and communication problems." Br. 01 s\-t _i. at " However. 
the court was responding to objections that defense counsel was asking leading questions, 
and the court merely explained that because of the need for an interpreter and the related 
need of "trying to communicate with these people" he was going to be lenient and permit 
such questioning (R. 193:166, 168). Add. C This clearly encompasses the general fact 
that both defendant and his sister-the only witnesses for the defense-spoke little English 
and required interpreters, and does not suggest that there is any problem with the manner 
or content of Huynh's performance. In fact, the majority of the witnesses in this case 
spoke a language other than English as their primary, if not only, language: defendant and 
his sister spoke Vietnamese only (R, 193:136, 162-63); Tai spoke Cantonese and English 
<k. I c ^ 41); Hanna spoke Korean and English (R. 193:85); Vu spoke Vietnamese and 
_ NhfR n ^ M3). 
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so. Consequently, he has not met his burden of establishing error in Huynh's 
performance, and his claim should fail.7 Marvin, 964 P.2d at 318 (where no harm is 
established, a plain error claim necessarily fails). 
Accordingly, whether reviewed under the invited error doctrine or the plain error 
doctrine, defendant is not entitled to reversal based on the trial court's acceptance of 
defendant's proffered interpreter. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S PLAIN ERROR CLAIM FAILS WHERE THE 
PROSECUTOR'S INITIAL REMARKS IN CLOSING WERE 
REASONABLE INFERENCES FROM THE EVIDENCE, AND ANY 
ERROR IN THE REBUTTAL REMARKS WAS NEITHER OBVIOUS NOR 
HARMFUL IN LIGHT OF THE COMPELLING EVIDENCE AGAINST 
DEFENDANT 
A. Background And Claim 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by making statements 
that were neither supported by the evidence nor objected to by defense counsel. Br. of 
Aplt. at 22-28. This claim stems from comments made by the parties in their closing 
arguments below. In his initial closing remarks, the prosecutor argued that Tai Luu and 
Hanna Kim were not mistaken about their identification of the perpetrator (R. 193:181-
83). He noted that they gave similar descriptions based on their own knowledge and their 
7Defendant also notes that Ms. Nguyen did not testify in complete compliance with 
defense counsel's opening statement. Br. of Aplt. at 20. However, nothing in the record 
supports defendant's suggestion that this was the fault of the interpreter. 
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individual opportunities to see him,, as w e^ll as on, the single factor which "distinguishes 
;..-;: :; >m many other people| | llic Lttl llial lie litij a qui,1 linn iihitk latlnnul mi In 
3SECUTOR] Tattoos in, today's society, ladies and gentlemen as I'm 
you realize, are very common. A, lot of people are having tattoos these days. 
of a question mark in the middle of one's forehead is unique [sic].. That 
distinguishes yourself from many other people. 
the stabber had a tattoo of a que^..-:. .nark in the im_:e of his iorehead, and I'm 
sure, as you're sitting there in the jury, you can look at Mr. Ha and see that he does 
have, in fact, a tattoo of a question, mark, in, the middle of his forehead. And the 
tion becomes how many people that were Asian, about five five. 120 pounds, 
:
 a tattoo of a question mark would have been at the club on May 19th, 1996? 
;sible people would that include? 
When you consider the ,. • *•  - :; io a \ cr> 
small small number. In fact, it i _.
 r,^, iv u ^ . i v ouid be Ha Minh 
— or Minh Ha, I'm sorry. For those who are n... - cians, and I certainly am 
not, maybe some of you are. but think of the mathematical probability that a 
p 21 soi l who's five five, 120 pounds and Asian, would ha\e a question mai: 
tattooed in the middle of their foreh. ' Think of the number of people that might 
include. It could be very small. But then consider how many people would be 
Asian five five, 120 [pounds], male, a tattoo with a question mark in the middle of 
your forehead,, and be at tf».- *Mi s on May 1,9th That groi lp becomes even, smaller. 
(R. 193:183-84) (in Add. D). The prosecutor then went into detail about the other 
reasons behind the witnesses' ability to identify defendant aside from the tattoo (R. 
D = fense counsel, registered no objection, but chose instead to address the remarks 
in his own closing argument. He first pointed out that, as defense counsel, he was not 
required to prove anything (R. 193:188) (in Add. D^ He then explained in detail why the 
21 
eyewitness identification testimony was wholly unreliable, urging the jury to look 
carefully at the jury instruction which noted that such testimony should be reviewed 
carefully (R. 193:190-91). Add. D. Finally, he argued: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL] The prosecutor has asked me and has asked you to 
deal in possibilities, mathematical possibilities, regarding the likelihood of an 
Asian with a tattoo in the middle of his forehead being present at a certain time and 
place. He's asking you to deal in possibilities. This is not proof. This is not 
proof, let alone proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It's speculation. 
(R. 193:195). Add. D. He went on to emphasize that the correct review of the evidence 
revealed that the State's case Mis rife with reasonable doubt'1 throughout, and closed with 
a reminder that the State, not defendant, had the burden of proof and that it was not met 
here(R. 193:195-96). Add. D. 
In rebuttal, the prosecutor again emphasized the bases for the identification 
testimony from both Tai Luu and Hanna Kim (R. 193:198-99) (in Add. D). He then 
addressed the tattoo as follows: 
[PROSECUTOR] I'm not talking about possibilities. I'm simply talking 
about reasonable conclusions from the evidence. I'm not asking you to speculate. 
I'm asking you to take the facts, the evidence, decide what the facts are, and then 
draw some reasonable inferences from those facts, and the instructions ask you to 
do that. 
So I go back to the question, how many people are going to have a tattoo in 
the middle of their forehead, in this society? There isn't going to be anyone but 
the defendant. That's how he's identified, and there might be a mistake about his 
height, his weight, his hair style, but it's unmistakable about the tattoo in the 
middle of his forehead. 
(R. 193:199). Add. D. 
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Because defense counsel below registered :\^ VLJ^L. . to the prosecutor ""s 
IL it ii i 1 r mi ml v ( le fend. ' i f i l .iiL»iitMi | i l . i i n i mi in in «i -' pill 11 in I in i i n n i l i T o m h n t 
must show that an error occurred, that it should have been obvious to the trial court, and 
that it was harmful. State v. Palmer. 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah App.) (citing State v. Dunn, 
850 I ~i\ ilhi, iJOc i Utah iv93)V cert, denied, 86b i\_u °> • tan i r):). 
DefemLiml 11.11 n r. iii.ii cum uei IIIUMI I ICUUM1 thnv ' \i'r. no sl.ilisliciil r\ i i lnu c 
offered at trial to support the prosecutor's claim that, statistical!) , defei idant is the only 
person in socieU with a tattoo of a question mark on his forehead.8 Br of Aplt. at 22, 25. 
He argues that the error should have been obv ious to a^ u i, ^^uri i\,uuSc nic juuge naa 
iwuidrks, defendant argues, then it was necessarily obvious during the prosecutor's 
rebuttal remarks because defense counsel had pointed out the deficiency in the evidence, 
alter - •
 iVh wie prosecutor reiterated i,u u.,v.wuiy unsupported remL. u u.;:: ^ rcaier 
8Defendant also faun^ itic f- M UMIH au a m [dciciiuanij is 
innocent, I'm sure his l a ^ ^T * _\ e a great explanation as to 
why the stabber and his ne same location.'1 (R. 
193:186). Br. of Aplt. at 23 Defense counsel clearly addressed this point in his own 
closing argument, emphasizing that the State, not dt carried the burden of proof 
and that defendant need not prove anything (R. 193 . ^5-96) Further, the jut*) 
was instructed several times about Mate's burden of 
proof (R 74, 77 90-92. 94 o - ]Q . .. ;c
 ? 195 , 
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served to unfairly bolster the credibility of the eyewitness identification testimony. Id. at 
23, 25-28. 
An appellate court will reverse on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct only if 
defendant establishes that: [1] "'the actions or remarks of [prosecuting] counsel call to the 
attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its 
verdict and, if so, [2] under the circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is 
substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, 
there would have been a more favorable resul t . . . . ' " State v. Longshaw. 961 P.2d 925, 
928 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Cummins. 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 1992), 
cert, denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993)) (additional quotations omitted). The evidence is 
to be viewed in light of the totality of evidence presented at trial. Longshaw. 96 P.2d at 
927; Cummins. 839 P.2d at 852. Moreover, counsel on both sides are given considerable 
latitude in their closing arguments. State v. Day. 815 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Utah App. 1991). 
"They have the right to fully discuss from their perspective the evidence and all 
inferences and deductions it supports." State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 
1989); see also Day. 815 P.2d at 1350. However, because defendant's claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct was not raised below, it is reviewed here for plain error. 
Cummins. 839 P.2d at 854-57. 
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M; Jkuiwuc:. ;;oth the prosecute-. . ..L.V*I ^ .;i.g ren.air^. a..u . . _ 
- * f 
remarks as defendant fails to establish the requisite plain error. 
Ba The Initial Remarks Were Reasonable Deductions From The Evidence, And 
Any Error In The Remarks Was Not Obvious To The Trial Court In Light Of 
Defense Counsel's Apparent Strategy To Use The Comments To His 
Advantage In His Closing Argument 
I In1 i n n n l s in nli. ill ii liuj; I lie \mr a ul in" iiiiiiiti.il r In in ' unit i tin nt iln in it \\ invint 
reversal as they did not amount to error. Defendant's claim that the prosecutor urged the 
jury to undertake a statistical review of the odds of someone else having the same tattoo, 
without offering statistical cnueiicw in support thereof, is an overstatement. Ihe 
piostn nihil s ri.Mn.irI* \ n -Jo'iintl ,ts iiiiigiin» lln pn \ 1 nsn rnminon 
sense in weighing the defense suggestion that someone else i nust have wielded the knife 
against the consistent physical descriptions of the attacker given by three of the State's 
witnesses, including tn^;: u^un.iiuus uescripuon . . .. .:,,, . ™i. ,L pro-L. 
tattoos are very common these days, then pointed out the uniqueness of a tattoo of a 
question mark in the middle of a forehead (R. 193:183). Add D. Then, three times in 
short succession tin: pioseajiui" expit issh pniulereiJ (tin ii.irm like In In n,i n fsomei mie 
who not only sported the same unique tattoo in the same spot as defendant, but was also 
Asian, five feet five inches tall, and weighed 120 pounds-like defendant-being at the 
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same club on the same night the stabbing occurred. Defense counsel expressly noted the 
narrow focus of the prosecutor's comments when he repeated them in his own closing 
remarks (R. 193:199). Add. D. When appropriately put in context, the prosecutor's 
initial remarks did not seek to put before the jury formal statistical information. Nor did 
the comments ask the jury to believe that defendant was the only person in existence with 
this tattoo on his forehead. To the contrary, the prosecutor allowed for the possibility that 
there might be someone else with the unique tattoo by noting that there might be a "small 
number" of people fitting that description and that the number "might" be as small as one 
(R. 193:183). Add. D. 
Instead, the prosecutor's remarks are a logical interpretation of the evidence from 
the prosecution's perspective and demonstrate for the jury the implausibility of the 
defense. The comments did not suggest that the jury convict defendant based on statistical 
evidence never adduced at trial. See State v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986) 
(urging the jury to convict defendants for reasons other than the evidence adduced at 
trial). The remarks were a reasonable deduction from the strong, consistent descriptions 
and identification testimony provided by three of the State's witnesses, defendant's 
description of his own height and weight, and defendant's "mistaken identity" defense. 
As such, they were acceptable closing argument and did not impermissibly bolster the 
credibility of the State's witnesses. See Cummins, 839 P.2d at 854 & n.15 (a prosecutor 
can comment on witness credibility to the extent the comment is a reasonable inference 
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from the evidence), Accoixiii igly , defendant fails to establisl i tl: :ie i eqi lisite e i: r c i i lpoi i 
In any event, any error in the initial remarks was not so obvious to the trial court as 
to constitute plain error under the second prong of the plain error test, The trial court 
must allow for reasonable inferences and deductions madv . ,._
 ru.._ n. _ 
d! m i l l lu l l II L M ., &1 i 1'" .'i I ill I II I h r i ill!! '. i l r l t ' l m i l i . l t m i l f 1 h i 1 p n if T i l l } n f s u c h 
statements "must be conducted in light of the realities of the proceedings, and must take 
into account each part) *s strategy and the theon >,T the case " n"mmins, 839 P.2d at 857. 
On then A.I^. uiv remarks appear to tx > , ; mat: a reason,..... ^euuv. .. .. 
mistaken identity defense by asking the jurors simply to use common sense when 
considering it, The fact that defense counsel did not voice an objection would reasonably 
suggest to the court that counsel might hav e had a strategic reason U r ...:> ^icncw . ;.*.t 
SI J U u C > i " " " " I ' ' ' ' I " I '"'' ' " ' l ( *C11 11 fl l " 1 1 ' ' ' ' I '' I ' • ' • 11 (* f V ' i k ' ' (. ( ' 11P -'' I 11 M H ' * * t ' 11 II111 • i n n i i I 111 I 11 
own closing argument. He went on to use the prosecutor's comments to support his 
w;iment that the State had failed to meet its burden of establishing guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, arguing that there \\a;, no
 snt^ >( < •' "I " "'jciiaiiu1 possihIilu.H 'I 
prost/i uli ir smii'hl li hnin1* flic jur\r consider, and that the prosecutor's speculative 
argument was one of a number of examples of howr the State had failed to establish its 
case by proof beyond a reasonable doubt (R, 193:189-96^ A Ai D It was reasonable in 
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this case for the trial court to refrain from commenting on the prosecutor's remarks, first, 
because they were a permissible inference from the evidence and theories produced at 
trial, and second, in deference to defense counsel's strategy not to object but to use the 
comments to defendant's benefit. See Cummins, 839 P.2d at 857. Accordingly, the trial 
court's failure to sua sponte act to mitigate any effects of the prosecutor's initial remarks 
did not amount to plain error. Id, 
C. Any Error In The Rebuttal Remarks Was Not Obvious To The Trial Court 
And Was Not Prejudicial In Light Of The Compelling Evidence Against 
Defendant 
Additionally, defendant argues that even if defense counsel's comments in his own 
closing argument served to ameliorate the effect of the prosecutor's initial comments, the 
additional remarks made in the prosecutor's rebuttal argument were made "with greater 
conviction and authority[,]" essentially reinforcing the original error. Br. of Aplt. at 26. 
As a preliminary matter, the written record does not reflect that the rebuttal 
remarks were any "stronger" or were made with any more conviction than the original 
remarks, despite defendant's repeated assertion of such. Id at 23, 25-26. The prosecutor 
made the remarks and moved on, and any embellishment, either physically or verbally, 
which would suggest he spoke with "greater conviction" is mere speculation. 
In rebuttal, the prosecutor slightly rephrased the remarks, giving his own 
determination that "there isn't going to be anyone" but defendant likely to have a tattoo in 
the middle of their forehead (R. 193:199). Add. D. To the extent the comment may be 
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improv idcnuy pnrasea ^ *;;e prosecutor ,<> upmiuii I .1 l.ii I 11 1 111 '\ itkiitc, i( 1 nii'1,1 
;
 Mir:^;, - > nment b^ osecutor during closing 
argument that the jury consider matters outside the evidence is prosecutorial 
misconduct."); see also State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483,, 486 (Utah 1984) (calling attention to 
a fact not in evidence constitutes misconduct). 
v ; , : . i v : 1 who- +;:kcn in 
context of the closing arguments. The prosecutor first properly explained the basis for his 
initial remarks, explaining that they were reasonable conclusions from the evidence (R. 
focused on the detailed original remarks, made not once but three times in the 
prosecutor's initial closing argument V ^ hile the prosecutor's brief restatement omitted 
^>\-r . »*•"•! "^  x rtrr>rk^ - * *l : cutor hau aiicduv put across, and 
was reasonably likely to take his rebuttal remarks in the same light 
Regardless, there is no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result absent the 
* * .*. 
conduct or remark will not be presumed prejudicial." Troy, 688 P.2d at 486 (citation 
omitted). In cases where the proof is less compelling, "this Court: will more closely 
MM nfinize the conduct," Id. The evidence against defendant in this case was very 
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compelling, despite defendant's attempt to portray it as weak, and the rebuttal remarks 
were not so inflammatory as to change the outcome of the trial. The proper and 
admissible testimony in this trial about defendant's identity was extensive and so much 
more weighty than the prosecutor's remark that it is difficult to see how the remark could 
have done much harm.9 
Without the rebuttal comment, the jury had three eyewitnesses who identified 
defendant in court, described his physical appearance as well as his unique tattoo, and put 
him at the Ha Vi the night of the stabbing. While the jury was instructed at length about 
the need to review eyewitness identification testimony with caution (R. 90-92-jury instr. 
20), the eyewitness testimony was sufficiently strong to support the jury's verdict 
independent of the challenged rebuttal comments from the prosecutor. 
Hanna Kim had seen defendant before May 19, had exchanged greetings and 
phone numbers with him (R. 193:88-89, 96). The night of the stabbing, she saw him at 
Ha Vi before she left (R. 193:96). During the stabbing incident, Hanna stood within an 
arms length of defendant, looking him in the face and yelling directly at him while others 
held him back (R. 193:48, 50, 52, 91, 92, 103, 105-08, 117). She later positively 
identified his photo from an array of six photos shown to her by police (R. 193:94). She 
consistently and positively identified him at all opportunities since the stabbing, including 
9Moreover, the jury was informed numerous times both verbally and in writing that 
it was to rely solely on the evidence and that statements by counsel were not considered 
evidence (R. 75, 78, 88; 193:19, 30-32, 179-80, 195-96). 
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the preliminary hearing and the trial (R, 190:7; 193:88), and she was familiar with his 
tattoo |K. ivi:vz, i l l i^), 
\ibu - He first saw him 
before he realized he had been stabbed. He was able to see defendant when he turned to 
look over his shoulder while at his ear and while he ran from,,, him, with his body half 
turned to watch defendant' s progress (R 193:45, 48 1 9, 101 02) I le • v 'as later ab le to 
>*•**' ' ' r1 ' " t>ehead R. 
193:62-63, 127 ~i , . While defendant was not the only individual Tai chose as a, possible 
suspect from a six-photo array, Tai positively identified defendant at both the preliminary 
hearing and ti Midi. Illl>lJ:J9, l"lij,4^4 J, oJ-oJ, L!/"^8>. 
\ I'jTiist' ilnl III'I rvnli/r ,it first th.it the in«~* J -*• w:i-: ir* more than a fight, 
and, as a spectator, was able to view the participants without the added emotion of the 
'
 v
*bing (R. 193:115-17), His identification of defendant in court was positive, based not 
only ^ R. 
193 
The defense adduced evidence that defendant could not remember being at Ha Vi 
in May, that he was either elsewhere in tl le Salt Lake area, or working iii i ^Ada. anu mat 
' *
 |sngs 
d<. 193.136-40, 147). His sister believed he was in the Salt Lake area during May 1996 
but did not go to Ha Vi that month and was not involved in any stabbing (R. 193:165, 
168, 172-73). 
In addition to this evidence, the jury could properly have considered as a 
reasonable inference the likelihood of someone who looked like defendant and had the 
same unique tattoo in the same unique location as defendant being at Ha Vi on the night 
of the stabbing. 
Given the strength of this identification evidence, there is little if any likelihood of 
a more favorable outcome for defendant absent the prosecutor's overbroad rebuttal 
comment that no one but defendant is likely to have a tattoo on his forehead. Whether 
defendant is the only person with a tattoo on his forehead, or is one of three or one of 
thirty, he is still reasonably likely to be one of only a small number of people whose 
tattoo is a question mark, who fits the physical description provided by the eyewitnesses, 
and who would have been at the Ha Vi on May 19, 1996. As defendant has failed to 
establish the requisite harm, his plain error claim fails.10 
10The same analysis applies to a review of the harmlessness of the challenged 
remarks in the prosecutor's initial closing argument. In light of the strong evidence 
regarding defendant's identity, there is no reasonable likelihood that, even absent the 
initial remarks-which emphasized the incredibility of the defense by asking the jurors 
simply to use common sense when viewing it-the jury would have acquitted defendant. 
Because the prosecutor's initial remarks, read in context, sought no more than was 
appropriate from the jury and resulted in no prejudice to defendant, defendant's claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct must fail. Cummins. 839 P.2d at 852-53; State v. Peters, 796 
P.2d 708, 712 (Utah App. 1990). 
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POINT III 
D E F E N S E COUNSEL DID NOT RENDER INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
AT TRIAL WHERE REASONABLE TRIAL STRATEGY EXISTS TO 
EXPLAIN HIS FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR'S 
REBUTTAL CLOSING REMARKS, AND DEFENDANT FAILS TO 
ESTABLISH PREJUDICE FROM HIS COUNSEL'S INACTION 
~ ^ndant claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he 
fr:i~i to object to the prosecutor's comments made in his rebuttal closing argument about 
29-31. 
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, defendant must 
show "'first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable 
mam. . e professional 
ji idgment and, second, that counsel's performance pre judiced the defendant.'" State v. 
t ii gu ::iles. 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996) fquotim n s v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 
(Utah), cert, denied, 5L* : . . - ' w i > i
 L - T)) (additional quotations omitted). 
counsel rendered adequate assistance. Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995). 
Counsel has wide latitude to make tactical decisions, and the appellate court will not 
question the decisions unless they have no reasonsx . _ ... ._dL 
"Defendant apparently recognizes that his counsel's failure to object to the 
prosecutor's initial closing remarks may be justified as reasonable trial strategy in light of 
the use to \\ hich defense counsel put the comments in his own closing argument. 
Not only must defendant establish both prongs of the test (State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 
1250, 1254 (Utah 1993)), but defendant cannot prevail on the prejudice prong unless he 
proffers evidence sufficient to support "'a reasonable probability that, but for his 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" 
Arguelles, 921 P.2d at 441 (quoting Parsons, 871 P.2d at 522) (additional citations 
omitted). A "reasonable probability" is defined as ";a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.'" Id (quoting State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 187 (Utah 
1990)) (additional quotations omitted). 
Defendant's claim fails in this case because of his failure to meet this burden. Even 
assuming this Court found any error in the rebuttal closing remark, (see Point II, supra), 
defense counsel's failure to object may be wholly justified as a matter of reasonable trial 
strategy. Under the circumstances of this case, defense counsel could reasonably have 
chosen not to object in hopes that the prosecutor's statement that no one would have the 
same tattoo would reinforce to the jury what defense counsel had argued in his earlier 
closing remarks: the prosecutor was asking the jury to rely on probabilities and 
possibilities unsupported by the evidence and not amounting to proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. To object and seek a curative instruction at that point also could send a message to 
the jury that this comment-which, on its face, demonstrates the point made by defense 
counsel in his closing argument-is different than the prosecutor's earlier proper remarks, 
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and to provide a curative instruction for only the rebuttal comment might tend to reinforce 
in the jury's eyes the propriety of the original remarks, 
claim,,,, I k'fcnd.int raise* an i< • * ~ * - ' • - - •
 1U ineffective assistance of 
counsel, "'a common standard is applicable. ' S t . . _ tz, 835 P.2d PO, 174 (Utah 
A
 —
 1092) (quoting State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116 11?1 - 15 (Utah 1 ° ° ° ^ failure to 
i r ;L plain LI mi 11.qiiu en w mil nl pn |inln i 
- -;'•-•- -uc- * * lv:" cl :r'm of ineffectiveness. in ihis case, defendant failed to 
i blish the requisite prejudice to support his ctaiin ^\ plain jrror regarding the 
prosecutor's rebuttal comments. See Point II, supra. Accordingly, his ineffective 
vp M ^ ' i. ii * . i , . L I t i l l 11/ *. 
,2Mon , r * oLou. . . * .,v<. tnji :~;, *.t *• a prosecutor' s 
•ing argument dees not, a., < <> . . . n the prejud.
 t ^d loi a claim of 
'ective assistance of counsel. 1 inU\son. 956 P.2d at 29'^  As defendant notes (Br. of 
at ^0), had defense counsel timeh objected, the trial o -art would have had an 
»rtunity to issue a curative instruction, which is normally presumed on appeal to be 
effective. Winward, 941 P.2d at 635. Consequently, the outcome is not likely to have 
been different had counsel, raised an ob jection. Finlayson, 9*^ P 2d r "M^; Win ward, 941 
P.2dat635. 
13Defendant also claims that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to object 
because it required him to argue plain error on appeal instead of simply arguing 
p i • ::: 'Secutorial misconduct. Br. of Aplt. at 31 However, the harm.ful.ness requirement, for 
1: • : 1:1 :i„. j: \i it I error and prosecutorial misconduct is the same. See Longshaw; 961 P.2d at 
929; Pataei, 860 P.2d at 342. Here, defendant has failed to establish the requisite harm 
foi his plain error claim. See Point II, supra. Accordingly, there is no reason to believ e 
he would have prevailed on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, defeating his assertion 
of prejudice from his inability to raise the claim. See, e.g.. State v. Gallegos. 967 P.2d 
POINT IV 
THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS 
CASE 
Defendant's final argument asserts that the cumulative effect of the errors 
involving appointment of the interpreter and the prosecutor's rebuttal closing remarks 
require a new trial. Br. of Aplt. at 31-32. 
Under the cumulative error doctrine, this Court "will reverse only if'the 
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence . . . that a fair trial was 
had."1 Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1229. Because defendant has not established the existence of 
multiple identifiable errors in this case, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply. 
State v. Basta. 966 P.2d 260, 264 n.2 (Utah App. 1998); see also Parsons, 871 P.2d at 516 
(refusing to apply the cumulative error analysis where defendant failed to establish any of 
his eight claims of ineffective assistance) (citing Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 806 
(Utah 1988)) (additional citations omitted). 
To the extent this Court disagrees and finds both errors defendant mentions, each 
of the errors constitutes harmless error, as set forth in Points I and II, supra. Defendant 
does not establish that Ms. Nguyen's testimony, in any respect, was not what the 
interpreter represented it to be, or that the prosecutor's rebuttal closing remarks 
973 (Utah App. 1998) (counsel's failure to perform a futile act does not render his 
performance ineffective); see also Parsons, 871 P.2d at 525 (where interrogation of a 
witness would have been futile under the facts at hand, counsel's failure to do so did not 
constitute ineffective assistance). 
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Improperly bolstered the testimony of the State's witnesses "with insupportable statistical 
infon 
iifnul.iiliye effeef of the harmless errors does not undermine confidence in the fairness of 
the trial in light of the evidence discussed in the Statement of Facts and Point 11, supra. 
Finlayson, 956 P.2d at 295 (where the issues demonstrated either no error or harmless 
error, and the cumulate w c i ; ^ ; oi ;;iuse errors does not under i i lii le c :)i: lfidei ice it lat a fall 
"«> i' > State \ . An I ; A 
932 P.2d 606, 617 (Utah Apr 1997), affd. 973 P.2d 975 ^Liak VJ, „). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests thai in.. L ..urt affirm 
defer idai it's coi I > • icti :: i is ai id set ltei ices. 
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ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
76-5-102. Assault. 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes or 
creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the person causes substantial bodily 
injury to another. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily 
injury to another. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-102, enacted by L. ment, effective May 1, 1995, added Subsection 
1974, ch. 32, § 38; 1989, ch. 51, § 1; 1991, ch. (3). 
75, § 3; 1995, ch. 291, § 4; 1996, ch. 140, § 1. The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- 1996, added Subsection (4). 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection 
(l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (1Kb) is a third degree felony 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-103, enacted by L. Subsection (lXa)" to the beginning of Subsec-
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 10; tion (1Kb); substituted "A violation of Subsec-
1989, ch. 170, § 2; 1995, ch. 291, § 5. tion UKa)" for "Aggravated assault" and "sec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- ond degree" for "third degree" in Subsection (2); 
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added "under and added Subsection (3). 
circumstances not amounting to a violation of 
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. CASTLE: 
Barton, 






















that was the amount of blood that you 1 
Mr, Lim's body? That does not account for 
, somewhere else, does it? 
> just what came out the chest tube 
Thank you. That's all I have. 
Okay. Dr. Barton, thank you. 
,, Mr. Castle? 
That's correct, your Honor. 
All right. You may call your 
We would call Tran Nguyen. 
. speak English. I do have an 
presents to translate her testimony. 
THE COURT: Very well. Let's have your 









\ interpreter been certified? 
Have you been certified? 
Actually, we don't have such 





















I mean through the administrative 





























Your name, sir? 
MR. HUYNH: Tam, T-A-M, and the last name is spelled 
H-U-Y-N-H. 
THE COURT: Will you, sir, please raise your right 
hand and take the oath of interpreter? 
TAM HUYNH, having been duly summoned and sworn as 
an interpreter for the Vietnamese language by and on behalf 
of the Defendant, interpreted as follows: 
MR. CASTLE: Can we approach the bench? 
THE COURT: Well, let's swear the witness first. 
And you are Ms. Nguyen? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. Would you take the oath? 
TRAN NGUYEN, having been duly summoned and sworn as 
a witness by and on behalf of the Defendant, took the stand 
and testified through the interpreter as follows: 
THE CLERK: Please take a seat, state your name and 
spell it. 
THE COURT: All right, Pete we can bring the same 
chair over. Counsel, if you want to come up now, go ahead. 
(Whereupon, discussion was held at the bench 
amoung the Court and both counsel, out of the 
hearing of the Jury and the Reporter.) 
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Barber, as a result of our 



























statement for the jury. 
MR. BARBER: That's correct, your Honor. 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I want to advise you 
in advance of questioning Ms. Nguyen, that Tom, who's the 
interpreter, is a friend of Ms. Nguyen's family. That 
includes the defendant, Mr. Minh Ha. He has been present 
during the trial. He was present during the preliminary 
hearing that we had in this case and has been present 
throughout the various court proceedings that have brought us 
to trial today. 
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Barber. Thank you. You 
may now examine the witness, Mr. Barber, if you wish. 
MR. BARBER: Thank you. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BARBER: 
Q. Would you please state your name and address? 
A. Nguyen Tran. 
Q. And would you spell that? 
A. N-G-U-Y-E-N. Tran is T-R-A-N. 
Q. And how would you prefer that I address you? 
A. Tran. 
Q. Tran, is that okay? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Tran, are you related to the defendant, Minh Ha? 
A. I am his sister. 




































By how many years? 
Three years. 
Did Minh live with you in your home for a time? 
Yes. 
Approximately what period of time did he reside with 
Until — I mean, from his separation with his 





And when did he separate from his ex-girlfriend, as 
you can recall? 
Around February, March of 1996. 
And how long after that time did he continue to reside 












Except for the time he took off to have a job in 
>, he lived with me since then. 
And when was it that he left to go to Texas? 
He used to left around May or June, that is the season 
people went out fishing in Texas. 
Are we talking about the year 1996? 
Yes, 1996. 
When did he return from Texas? 
Around November of 1996. 































Yes, he lived with me. 
Until when? 
Until around March or April of 1997 when he asked my 1 






of one of his sister's friends. 
Now Tran, I want you to cast your memory bac 
date of May 19th of 1996. 
THE COURT: So is there a question pending? 
(By MR. BARBER:) Do you remember that day? 
I can't remember exactly because usually my 











MR. CASTLE: Your Honor, I'm going to object 
remember this date and has stated that. She. 
k in time 
friend 
She 
THE COURT: There's been no follow-up question. 
(By MR. BARBER:) Do you remember during the 
1996, what Minh's habits were? What did he 
g when he got off work? 
Not that I recall. 
Do you recall that he ever went to a placed 
a Vi? 
MR. CASTLE: Objection, your Honor, leading. 
THE COURT: I'm going to allow that question 
somewhat unusual circumstances involving the 




































THE WITNESS: Let me repeat what she said. Once a 
while Minh came to Cafe Ha Vi and one of his friends, Jon, 
told me that he — 
MR. CASTLE: Objection, your Honor, hearsay, and I 
also want to object based on foundation, unless she knows 
personally versus hearing it. 
THE COURT: Well, the objection as to hearsay based on 
what somebody told her is sustained. 
Q. (By MR. BARBER:) Do you know that Minh occasionally 
went to the Cafe Ha Vi? 
MR. CASTLE: Objection, your Honor, hearsay. This is 
just the same question again. She was indicating it was 
based on what someone else has told her. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure we're at the point, 
counsel, where we've actually gotten what she knows. We have 
inquired into what someone has told her, but I think the 
question as to what she knows is a legitimate question. I'm 
willing to hear her answer to that question. 
THE WITNESS: Once a while he go to Cafe Ha Vi with 
his friends. 
Q. (By MR. BARBER:) All right. Now, Tran, when Minh 
came home on the evenings — on any of the evenings that you 
understood he had been to the Cafe Ha Vi, did you ever 
observe anything unusual about him? 










































Did you ever have a conversation with Minh in which 






CASTLE: Objection, your Honor, hearsay. 
COURT: Well, it's a leading question, but we've 
.em here, obviously, of trying to communicate with 
. e . J 
has testified that whenever he came home he was 





MR. BARBER:) All right. Did you ever observe 
.nhfs clothing when he came from the Cafe Ha Vi? 
you ever observe Minh to be in an excited or an 1 





Minh ever state to you in words or in substance 
> hiding from anyone? J 










Specifically a knife that would have had a blade 




























Q. Did you ever in going through the house find any 1 





MR. BARBER: That's all I have. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Castle? 
MR. CASTLE: Thank you, your Honor. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. CASTLE: 1 
Tran, let's talk about your relationship with Minh. 
talk about that? 
THE COURT: Well, do you mean you want to ask her some 














(By MR. CASTLE:) Minh is your brother? 
Yes. 
He's a member of your family? 
Yes, that's correct. 
You care deeply about him? 
Yes. 
It's — you're here to help him today? 
Yes. 
You realize this stabbing we're talking about happened 
a year and a half ago? 
I heard about that. 
And you became aware that he had been arrested in May 




























Q. Back in May of 1996, though, you did not have any 
reason to remember what Minh was specifically doing that 
month, did you? 
A. He didn't do anything. 
Q. But you did not have any reason to remember what it 
was he was doing in May of 1996? 
A. Yes, but a couple of months later, I heard Jon, Minh 
friend, told me that people suspect Minh in that incident. 
Q. So several months after May you were told by a police 
officer that the police were looking for Minh? 
A. No, not from the police. 
Q. A friend told you, a friend of Minh's, that the police 
were looking for him? 
A. No, but he — his friend told me that rumor around 
town said that Minh was a suspect in the stabbing. 
Q. But that happened months after May of 1996? 
A. Yes, that's correct. 
Q. So back im May of 1996 you didn't have any reason to 
specifically remember what Minh was doing, did you? 
A. He didn't do anything. 
Q. That's not my question. My question is, in May of 
1996, she had no reason to specifically remember what Minh 
was doing because it wasn't until months later that she 



























A. That's correct, until a couple months later when I 
heard from Jon and I called and talked to him over the phone. 
At the time Minh was in Texas. 
Q. So when you heard from a friend that the police were 
look looking for Minh, you called Minh in Texas? 
A. There was no police call, I just heard from Jon Minh's 
friend. 
Q. When she heard that news — when you heard that news, 
did you call Minh in Texas and tell him about it? 
A. Yes, I did call him. 
Q. What month did you call him? 
A. Minh called me early August and at the end of August I 
did call him. 
Q. And even though you told him the police were looking 
for him, he stayed in Texas until November, correct? 
MR. BARBER: Object, your Honor, it's argumentative. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't think so. It's 
cross-examination. I think it's a fair question. 
THE WITNESS: Minh stay there until November before he 
returned to Utah. 
Q. (By MR. CASTLE:) When he returned to Utah, he was 
here for how many months? 
A. Another seven or eight month until he left for 
Seattle. 

















































I remember around the end of March or earlier April. 1 
So he came back in November and he left in March or 1 
? 1 
Yes, he did ask me to go for about a week. 1 
Sorry, I didn't understand that. 1 
He did ask me that he will go for a week. 1 
So his plan was to go to Seattle and stay one week and J 
return? J 
Yeah, yes, uh-huh (affirmative). 1 
When did he leave? 1 
I can't remember the date, but it's around the end of 
or early April. 
Actually, he was in Seattle much longer than one week, 
e not? 
Yes. 
You indicated he came back in November of 1996 to 
Yes. 
Prior to that time in August you told him the police 
looking for him? 
I didn't tell him about the police because I didn't 
about police looking for him. I just heard that he was 
involved in this incident from what his friends told me. 
Q. 
A. 
During the time — what month did he leave for Texas? 







































During the time that he was living with you, did you 
go with him to the Ha Vi Cafe, or Cafe Ha Vi? 
Because I have small baby, so I never go. 1 
So you never went with him to Ha Vi? 1 
I didn't go with him, but he always told me wherever 
• 1 
So your knowledge about him going to the Ha Vi is 
on what your brother Minh told you? 
Yes, whatever he did, he told me. 1 
He could have gone somewhere else, though, for all you 
Decause you weren't there? 
That's correct, but wherever he go, he used to call me 













Did he have a job here in in May of 1996? 
He worked at the airport. 
How many times did he go to the Ha Vi in April of 
Couple times. 
How many times? 
Around three times. 
What were the dates that he went? 
I can't remember. 
You didn't make any notes about when said he was going 




























Q. That would be true about May of 1996 also, wouldn't 
it? 
A. I didn't hear — he told me me went to Ha Vi at all. 
Q. But she didn't make any notes, written notes, about 
the number of times Minh went to Ha Vi in May, did she? 
A. No. 
Q. Tran, was it your practice to inspect the clothes of 
Minh when he would return from wherever he had been? 
A. I wash all of his clothes. 
Q. When you washed his clothes, were you looking for 
things like blood? 
A. No. 
Q. At your home you have kitchen knives, do you not? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. You have knives that are sharp that cut meat, things 
like that, in your home? 
A. Yes, I have two of them. 
Q. Just like every other household, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you testified earlier that you didn't — you don't 
know what his habits were in terms of what he did on a 
typical day? 
A. He didn't have any real habit. He just act very 
normal. He just go home and stay home. 


































All right. Is there anything further, 1 
Just a couple of questions on redirect, J 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BARBER: 1 
Tran, you testified in response to Mr. Castle's 1 
















had two knives in your home; is that 1 
of those knives ever end up missing? 1 
of those knives ever show up with blood 1 
When you were — before you testified today, you were 1 




and you understand that that oath meant 
you are to tell the truth? 1 
Yes, I just tell the truth. 









you may step 
And 
Nothing further. Thank you. 
All right. If there's nothing further 
down, ma'am. 
thank you, sir, for your assistance here. 
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Addendum C 
Rule 3-306. Court interpreters. 
Intent: 
To declare the policy of the Utah State Courts to secure the rights of persons 
who are unable to understand or communicate adequately in the English 
language when they are involved in legal proceedings. 
To outline the procedure for certification, appointment, and payment of court 
interpreters. 
lb provide certified interpreters in all cases in those languages for which 
certification programs have been established. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to legal proceedings in the courts of record and not of 
record. 
This rule shall apply to interpretation for non-English speaking persons and 
not to interpretation of the hearing impaired. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Definitions. 
(A) "Appointing authority" means a trial judge, administrative hearing 
officer or other officer authorized by law to conduct judicial or quasi-judicial 
proceedings, or a delegate thereof. 
(B) "Certified interpreter" means a person who has fulfilled the require-
ments set forth in subsection 4. 
(C) "Qualified interpreter" means an uncertified interpreter who has been 
found by the appointment authority to be qualified pursuant to subsection 
6(B). 
(D) "Code of Professional Responsibility" means the Code of Professional 
Responsibility for Court Interpreters set forth in Appendix H. 
(E) "Legal proceeding" means a civil, criminal, domestic relations, juvenile, 
traffic or administrative proceeding. Legal proceeding does not include a 
conference between the non-English speaking person and the interpreter that 
occurs outside the courtroom, hearing room, or chambers unless ordered by the 
appointing authority. In juvenile court legal proceeding includes the intake 
stage. 
(F) "Non-English speaking person" means any principal party in interest or 
witness participating in a legal proceeding who has limited ability to speak or 
understand the English language. 
(G) "Principal party in interest" means a person involved in a legal proceed-
ing who is a named party, or who will be bound by the decision or action, or who 
is foreclosed from pursuing his or her rights by the decision or action which 
may be taken in the proceeding. 
(H) "Witness" means anyone who testifies in any legal proceeding. 
(2) Advisory panel. Policies concerning court interpreters shall be developed 
by a court interpreter advisory panel, appointed by the council, comprised of 
judges, court staff, lawyers, court interpreters, and experts in the field of 
linguistics. 
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(3) Minimum performance standards. All certified and qualified interpret-
ers serving in the court shall comply with the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility. 
(4) Certification. 
(A) Subject to the availability of funding, and in consultation with the 
advisory panel, the administrative office shall establish programs to certify 
court interpreters in the non-English languages most frequently needed in the 
courts. The administrative office shall: 
(i) designate languages for certification; 
(ii) establish procedures for training and testing to certify and recertify 
interpreters; and 
(iii) establish, maintain, and issue to all courts in the state a current 
directory of certified interpreters. 
(B) To become certified an interpreter shall: 
(i) prior to participation in the training program, pay a fee of $100.00 to the 
administrative office to offset the costs of training and testing; 
(ii) complete training as required by the administrative office; 
(iii) obtain a passing score on the court interpreter's test(s) as required by 
the administrative office; and 
(iv) comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
(C) An interpreter may be certified upon submission of satisfactory proof to 
the advisory panel that the interpreter is certified in good standing by the 
federal courts or by a state having a certification program that is equivalent to 
the program established under this section. 
(5) Recertification. 
(A) Subject to the availability of funding, the administrative office shall 
establish continuing educational requirements for maintenance of certified 
status. 
(B) l b maintain certified status, a certified interpreter shall: 
(i) comply with continuing educational requirements as established by the 
administrative office; and 
(ii) comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
(6) Appointment. 
(A) Certified interpreters. When an interpreter is requested or when the 
appointing authority determines that a principal party in interest or witness 
has a limited ability to understand and communicate in English, a certified 
interpreter shall be appointed except under those circumstances specified in 
subsection (6KB) or (C). 
(B) Qualified interpreters. 
(i) Standards for appointment. A qualified interpreter may be appointed 
only under the following circumstances: 
(a) if there is no certification program established under subparagraph (4) 
for interpreters in the language for which an interpreter is needed, 
(b) if there is a certification program established under subsection (4), but 
no certified interpreter is reasonably available, or 
(c) for juvenile probation conferences, if the probation officer does not speak 
a language understood by juvenile. 
(ii) Procedure for appointment. Before appointing a qualified interpreter, 
the appointing authority or delegate shall: 
(a) evaluate the totality of the circumstances including the gravity of the 
judicial proceeding and the potential penalty or consequence to the accused 
person involved, 
(b) qualify the prospective interpreter by asking questions as to the follow-
ing matters in an effort to determine whether the interpreter has a minimum 
level of qualification: 
(1) whether the prospective interpreter appears to have adequate language 
skills, knowledge of interpreting techniques and familiarity with interpreting 
in a court or administrative hearing setting; and 
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(2) whether the prospective interpreter has read, understands, and agrees 
to comply with the code of professional responsibility for court interpreters set 
forth in appendix H 
(in) The procedure to qualify a non certified interpreter need not recur every 
time the interpreter is used Within each judicial district the names of 
non certified interpreters who have been qualified by the appointing authority 
pursuant to subsection (6KB) shall be placed on a list for use by the district in 
cases where a certified interpreter is not reasonably available 
(iv) Court employees may serve as qualified interpreters, but their service 
shall be limited to short hearings that do not take them away from their 
regular duties for extended periods 
(C) Non qualified intetptetei A non-certified, non-qualified interpreter may 
be appointed when a certified or qualified interpreter is not reasonably 
available, or the court determines that the gravity of the case and potential 
penalty to the accused person involved are so minor that delays attendant to 
obtaining a certified or qualified interpreter are not justified 
(7) Waiter 
(A) A non-English speaking person may at any point in the proceeding 
waive the right to the services of an interpreter, but only when 
(i) the waiver is approved by the appointing authority after explaining on 
the record to the non-English speaking person through an interpreter the 
nature and effect of the waiver, 
(n) the appointing authority determines on the record that the waiver has 
been made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and 
(in) the non English speaking person has been afforded the opportunity to 
consult with his or her attorney 
(B) At any point in any proceeding, for good cause shown, a non-English 
speaking person may retract his or her waiver and request an interpreter 
(8) Oath All interpreters, before commencing their duties, shall take an 
oath that they will make a true and impartial interpretation using their best 
skills and judgment in accordance with the Code of Professional Responsibility 
(9) Removal in individual cases Any of the following actions shall be good 
cause for a judge to remove an interpreter in an individual case 
(A) being unable to interpret adequately, including where the interpreter 
self reports such inability, 
(B) knowingly and willfully making false interpretation while serving in an 
official capacity, 
(C) knowingly and willfully disclosing confidential or privileged information 
obtained while serving in an official capacity, 
(D) failing to follow other standards prescribed by law and the Code of 
Professional Responsibility, and 
(E) failing to appear as scheduled without good cause 
(10) Removal from certified or qualified list Any of the following actions 
shall be good cause for a court interpreter to be removed from the certified list 
maintained under subsection (4)(A)(in) or from the qualified list maintained 
under subsection (6XBX111) 
(A) knowingly and willfully making false interpretation while serving in an 
official capacity, 
(B) knowingly and willfully disclosing confidential or privileged information 
obtained while serving in an official capacity, 
(C) failing to follow other standards prescribed by law and the Code of 
Professional Responsibility, and 
(D) failing to appear as scheduled without good cause 
(11) Discipline The advisory panel shall review and respond to allegations 
of violations of the Code of Professional Conduct, including decertification or 
other disciplinary measures Interpreters being disciplined will be given notice 
of the disciplinary action and an opportunity to respond 
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(12) Payment 
(A) Courts of tecord 
(I) In courts of record, the administrative office shall pay interpreter fees 
and expenses in 
(a) criminal cases in which the defendant is determined to be indigent, 
(b) juvenile court cases brought by the state, 
(c) cases filed against the state pursuant to U R C P 65B(b) or 65C, and 
(d) other cases in which the court determines that the state is obligated to 
pay for an interpreter's services 
(II) In all other civil cases and small claims cases, the party engaging the 
services of the interpreter shall pay the interpreter fees and expenses 
(III) Fees Certified court interpreters shall be paid $30 per hour Qualified 
interpreters in languages for which there is no certification program shall be 
paid $25 per hour Qualified interpreters in languages for which there is a 
certification program shall be paid $20 per hour This section does not apply to 
court employees acting as interpreters 
(iv) Expenses Mileage for interpreters will be paid at the same rate as state 
employees for each mile necessarily traveled in excess of 50 miles round trip 
Per diem expenses will be paid at the same rate as state employees 
(v) Procedure for payment The administrative office shall pay fees and 
expenses of the interpreter upon receipt of a certification of appearance signed 
by the clerk of the court The certification shall include the name, address and 
social security number of the interpreter, the case number, the dates of 
appearance, the language interpreted, and an itemized statement of the 
amounts to be paid 
(B) Courts not of record 
(I) In courts not of record, the local government that funds the court not of 
record shall pay interpreter fees and expenses in criminal cases in which the 
defendant is determined to be indigent 
(II) In small claims cases, the party engaging the services of the interpreter 
shall pay the interpreter fees and expenses 
(III) Fees The local government that funds the court not of record shall 
establish the amount of the interpreter fees 
(iv) Expenses The local government that funds the court not of record shall 
establish interpreter expenses, if any, that will be paid 
(v) Procedure for payment The local government that funds the court shall 
pay the interpreter upon receipt of a certification of appearance signed by the 
clerk of the court The certification shall include the name, address and social 
security number of the interpreter, the case number, the dates of appearance, 
the language interpreted, and an itemized statement of the amounts to be 
paid 
(Repealed and reenacted effective November 1, 1996, amended effective 
December 13, 1996, November 1, 1998, April 1, 1999 ) 
Repeals and Reenac tmen t s — Former 
Rule 3 306 relating to appointment and pay 
ment of court interpreters and standards for 
court interpreter service was repealed and the 
present rule enacted effective November 1, 
1996 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend 
ment deleted "and the probation stage" from 
the end of Subdivision <1KE> ldded Subdivi 
sion (4 MB Mi) making related designation 
changes and added Subdivision (6MBMIMC), 
making related changes 
The 1998 amendment deleted "because of a 
non English speaking cultural background" be-
fore "to understand" in the paragraph of Intent 
and substituted **staflT for "administrators" in 
Subdivision (2) 
The 1999 amendment rewrote Subdivision 
(12M A Mm) inserting "in languages for which 
there is no certification program" in the first 
sentence adding the second sentence and sub 
stituting the last sentence for "Court employees 
acting as interpreters pursuant to (6MBMIV) 
shall be paid their regular hourly rate and shall 
not receive additional payment for interpreter 
services " 
Cross References. — Code of professional 
responsibility for court interpreters, Appx 11 
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had seen him on three prior occasions. She testified that 
she gave Minh Ha her phone number, and what do both of them 
say about Minh Ha that distinguishes him from many other 
people? Is the fact that he has a question mark tattooed on 
his forehead. 
Tattoos in today's society, ladies and gentlemen, as 
I'm sure you realize, are very common. A lot of people are 
having tattoos these days. But of a question mark in the 
middle of one's forehead is unique. That distinguishes 
yourself from many other people. 
When you consider the evidence, recall that Tai Luu 
and Hanna Kim said the stabber had a tattoo of a question 
mark in the middle of his forehead, and I'm sure, as you're 
sitting there in the jury, you can look at Mr. Ha and see 
that he does have, in fact, a tattoo of a question mark in 
the middle of his forehead. And the question becomes how 
many people that were Asian, about five five, 120 pounds, 
with a tattoo of a question mark would have been at the club 
on May 19th, 1996? How many possible people would that 
include? 
When you consider the uniqueness of the tattoo, it 
comes down to a very small, small number. In fact, it might 
just be one, and that one would be Ha Minh — or Minh Ha, I'm 
sorry. For those who are mathematicians, and I certainly am 



























probability that a person who's five five, 120 pounds and 
Asian, would have a question mark tattooed in the middle of 
their forehead. Think of the number of people that might 
include. It could be very small. But then consider how many 
people would be Asian, five five, 120, male, a tattoo with a 
question mark in the middle of your forehead, and be at the 
club on May 19th. That group becomes even smaller. 
What's unique about this case is that Tai Luu and 
Hanna Kim are basing their identification, particularly Hanna 
Kim, on the fact that she knows him, has known him before, 
not just based on his tattoo, but they had that additional 
information that separates Minh Ha from everyone else in 
terms of who it was that committed this very serious crime. 
Now, there might be a question about whether Minh Ha 
intended to hit Hanna Kim as she was attempting to rescue Tai 
Luu, and ladies and gentlemen, there is another instruction 
that was read to you that talks — that answers this 
question, and that is instruction number 17. When it comes 
to an assault, an assault can occur one of three ways. One 
can intentionally do it, one can knowingly do it, one can 
recklessly do it. It doesn't require the same mental state 
as aggravated assault. 
You'll note the instruction regarding aggravated 
assault. It says, "Intentionally or knowingly assaulted Tai 
Luu." 
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It's a privilege to be entrusted with making the kind of 
decision that you are going to make today, the decisions that 
affect lives of several people, not the least of whom is my 
client, Mr. Minn Ha. 
Now, I don't want you to think for a moment that we 
are downplaying in any way the severity of the wound that Mr. 
Tai Luu sustained, and I don't want you to think that we are 
attacking him in the sense of claiming that this event never 
happened. It's clear, it's clear he was stabbed. And we 
don't condone that kind of behavior. That is clearly outside 
the pale of civilized behavior. That's why we have laws, but 
the question that confronts you, ladies and gentlemen, and 
the question that should intrigue you, indeed, it should more 
than intrigue you, it should dominate your thinking until you 
have reached a verdict, is whether or not the State of Utah 
has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of 
the crimes of which my client is charged because, you see, as 
defense counsel, I don't have to prove anything. I'm not 
required to prove a negative. 
The Court instructed you in its instruction number 7, 
and I hope you'll take a good look at it when you get in the 
jury room, all presumptions independent of evidence are in 
favor of innocence and a defendant is presumed innocent until 
he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and in case of 



























shown, he is entitled to an acquittal. 
Now, that does not mean it's a matter of discretion. 
That means he is entitled to be acquitted of the crimes for 
which he is charged unless and until you, as members of the 
jury, determine that the State of Utah has proven every 
element of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt. I 
hope that presumption of innocence and the phrase "reasonable 
doubt" will resonate in your mind as you begin your 
consideration of the evidence in this case. 
Contrary to my colleague's argument to you, there is a 
great deal of conflict in the State's evidence regarding what 
what happened, regarding when it happened, regarding the 
perpetrator. For example, you will recall that Hanna Kim 
identified the assailant as someone known as Richard. But 
aside from her testimony, there is nothing that links this 
name Richard with Minh Ha. 
You will recall, and as I argue, let me hand you 
State's Exhibit Number 6 for you to look at. You will recall 
that Mr. Tai Luu, when presented with a photographic lineup, 
identified one of two people who could have been the possible 
assailants. When you look on State's Exhibit Number 6, you 
will see that Mr. Minh Ha who is on there, has a tattoo in 
the middle of his forehead. The other gentleman who was 
identified as a possible assailant does not. 



























critical to the State's case because it is all they have to 
tie Mr. Minn Ha to this particular crime, and you need to 
review very carefully Judge Frederick's instruction number 20 
as to identification, eyewitness identification, because 
eyewitness identification is not conclusive. It is not the 
end all and be all of the case. As that instruction will 
explain to you or explains to you, there are numerous factors 
that go into determining whether an identification, an 
eyewitness identification, especially in the heat of the 
moment, whether that type of identification is reliable, and 
you need to look at that instruction number 20 very 
carefully, but let me give you a few points to assist you in 
your analysis in instruction number 20 and the eyewitness 
identification. 
Number one, the incident happened sometime between one 
and two in the morning. It was dark. The incident happened 
in a parking lot outside of the Cafe Ha Vi, the parking lot 
that is not particularly well lighted. In fact, as the 
witnesses testified, certain areas are in the shadow because 
of the nature of the building and where the lights are. 
There is a tremendous amount of distraction going on. 
Mr. Tai Luu testified that he went out to the car and he 
wasn't sure, remember, he had a long colloquy about whether 
he was accompanied or whether he wasn't, and finally he 



























were knives in her home, and she said yes, she had two sharp 
knives. But neither of those knives ever turned up missing. 
Neither of them ever had a blood stain. 
You'll recall also the testimony of Hanna Kim and you 
will you recall that she and I had a discussion regarding 
whether or not the assailant actually had a knife. She 
believed it was a knife butt and she saw a flash of blade. 
Now, Tai Luu said the knife was seven to nine inches long. 
If Hanna Kim is confronting my client face to face and 
if his hands are being held up and restrained, where is the 
knife blade? Where is that knife blade? You're not going to 
be able, unless you have great big hands, and I don't, you're 
not going to be able to hide that knife completely in your 
hand. The blade is going to protrude out or the handle will 
protrude out and you're going to be holding on to the blade 
and risk cutting up your hand. But there's nobody's hand 
that's going to be able to hide that entire knife within it. 
The prosecutor has asked me and has asked you to deal 
in possibilities, mathematical possibilities, regarding the 
likelihood of an Asian with a tattoo in the middle of his 
forehead being present at a certain time and place. He's 
asking you to deal in possibilities. This is not proof. 
This is not proof, let alone proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
It's speculation. 



























the testimony of the witnesses. Now, when you look at that 
evidence dispassionately, freeing yourself for — from 
sympathy for the victims, as well as for my client, and 
viewing the facts as you've been instructed to do, you will 
see that the prosecutor's case is rife with reasonable doubt. 
And it's not just reasonable doubt as to one element, it's 
reasonable doubt all the way through. 
As I said before, my burden isn't to prove anything. 
The State who brings to bear the force of organized 
government and the power to punish is the one who must prove, 
and I submit to you respectfully that the State has not 
carried its burden in this case and that my client is 
entitled to a verdict of not guilty. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you, Mr. Barber. 
Mr. Castle? 
MR. CASTLE: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, when I 
spoke to you, I asked, or had hoped that defense counsel 
would answer my question about why is it that the stabber has 
a tattoo in the middle of his forehead and why does the 
defendant have that same tattoo in the same location? He 
never answered that question. 
Something else that didn't happen either in this case, 
ladies and gentlemen, and that is when Mr. Barber stood up to 
you and gave his opening statement, he said that evidence he 
would offer was that Mr. Minh Ha was at this club, but he 
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left before the stabbing. That never happened. Minn Ha 
himself said he was in Texas the month of 1996. His sister 
Tran said, "Oh, yeah, oh, but he was in Salt Lake — or Salt 
Lake County May of 1996." They couldn't even get their 
stories straight about when he was here. He claims he wasn't 
here at all, he was in Texas working. He also said he didn't 
have a job and that's why he went to Texas. According to 
Tran, he did have a job and had some kind of habit about 
coming home at a certain time. None of that panned out in 
terms of what the defense counsel said the evidence was going 
to be and what it turned out to be. 
And there is an old saying, and it is the law, the 
defendant doesn't have to prove anything, but if they put on 
evidence, it has to make common sense, it has to be 
consistent. Your decision is based on common sense and your 
own life experiences. 
With respect to the issue of reasonable doubt, that is 
the burden the State has, but I want you to know and the 
instructions so state, the State doesn't have to prove this 
case beyond a shadow of a doubt. There is a statement in 
instruction number 7 that says proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt does not require proof to an absolute certainty. Now, 
why do we have that standard? The only way you would know 
beyond a reasonable doubt or the only way you would know 



























the club when the stabbing occurred. You're relying on the 
testimony of other witnesses to inform you to make up your 
mind. 
One thing to remember about witnesses is that there 
will be some minor inconsistencies, and I would submit that 
that's what has occurred with the three witnesses that were 
there that testified. Why are those — why are there minor 
inconsistencies in that? Because people see things 
differently. People remember things differently, and people 
have their own unique way of expressing what it is they saw. 
Remember that none of these witnesses have English as 
their first language. English is their second language and 
Vu and Hanna are well spoken when it comes to English. They 
speak very good English. But they're simply attempting to 
recall what it is they saw. 
What about this identification issue? Remember that 
Tai Luu identified two people in the photo lineup, two, but 
one of those was Minh Ha. He identified them at the 
preliminary hearing and he identified them here in court. 
Hanna Kim who also looked at the photo spread and that's 
State's Exhibit 9. She immediately identified only one 
person and that was Minh Ha. Think about Hanna Kim and her 
ability to recognize. 
This case is based upon the testimony of those three 



























If you believe one, like Hanna Kim, the defendant is guilty 
of this crime. Remember she had seen him three times before. 
She had given him her phone number. She saw him there that 
night at the club inside, as well as outside. Remember she 
went toe to toe with this guy. She was staring him straight 
in the face, yelling and screaming at him to stop, wondering 
why he had acted this way, and her attention was focused on 
his face, not on what he had in his hand. 
Remember that Tai Luu said he was stabbed, that the 
defendant had the knife in his right hand, and the defendant 
told us on the stand that in fact he is right-handed. 
I'm not talking about possibilities. I'm simply 
talking about reasonable conclusions from the evidence. I'm 
not asking you to speculate. I'm asking you to take the 
facts, the evidence, decide what the facts are, and then draw 
some reasonable inferences from those facts, and the 
instructions ask you to do that. 
So I go back to the question, how many people are 
going to have a tattoo in the middle of their forehead, in 
this society? There isn't going to be anyone but the 
defendant. That's how he's identified, and there might be a 
mistake about his height, his weight, his hair style, but 
it's unmistakable about the tattoo in the middle of his 
forehead. 
Why is not a knife ever found? Well, that's easy to 
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